A receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) framework for autonomous ground vehicle navigation using ambient cellular signals of opportunity (SOPs) is developed. The developed framework considers a ground vehicle navigation exclusively with cellular long-term evolution (LTE) signals and an inertial measurement unit (IMU), without global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals. A fault detection test is developed to deal with biased LTE pseudorange measurements and a horizontal protection level (HPL) calculation is derived. Experiments to evaluate the developed RAIM framework are presented for a ground vehicle navigating in an urban environment over a trajectory of 1.35 km. It is demonstrated that the RAIM framework detects and excludes biased pseudoranges, reducing the root mean-squared error (RMSE) by 49%.
geometric configuration, high carrier-to-noise ratio of the received signals, and high bandwidth compared to GNSS signals [7] . In particular, long-term evolution (LTE) signals have a bandwidth up to twenty times higher than that of GPS L1 C/A, which yields better suppression of multipath effects [8, 9] . The recent literature have reported experimental navigation results with standalone cellular signals with meter-level accuracy on ground vehicles [9] [10] [11] [12] and centimeter-level accuracy on aerial vehicles [13, 14] . Moreover, it was demonstrated that these signals could provide lane-level accuracy when coupled with a lidar without GNSS signals [15] .
As the number of systems that rely on cellular SOPs for navigation grows, the need for monitoring the integrity of cellular-based navigation solutions increases. Integrity monitoring refers to the capability of the system to detect anomalies and warn the user when the system should not be used. A high-integrity navigation system must be able to reject incorrect measurements and provide an integrity metric of the confidence in these systems' performance at any time. Similar to the integrity of a GNSS-based navigation solution, the most pressing concern in integrity monitoring of a cellular-based navigation solution is the user's ability to recognize when it is safe to use the system.
Integrity monitoring for GNSS-based navigation for AGVs has been studied in the literature. In [16] , a framework was proposed to provide integrity provision at the lane-level. The framework warns the user whenever it detects performance anomalies. The method in [16] fuses measurements from a GNSS receiver, an odometer, and a gyroscope with road information through a multiple hypothesis particle filter. The problem of fault detection and isolation in navigation system for passenger vehicles was studied in [17] , where the GNSS-based navigation solution is compared with the vehicle's on-board sensors' solution. Then, a sequential statistical test is used to detect discrepancies between the two solutions. The primary differences between the concept of user-level integrity monitoring applied to air transport navigation systems and land vehicle navigation systems was studied in [18] . In [19] , a framework to monitor the positioning performance of real-time relative positioning (RRP) systems was proposed, with focus on cooperative intelligent transport systems. The framework considered the state data of the surrounding vehicles obtained from GNSS and dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) units. The monitoring framework provided instantaneous reliability assessment of the RRP systems, which yielded timely alerts to users when the navigation solution cannot be trusted. In [20] , an extended Kalman filter (EKF)-based integrity monitoring framework was proposed, which fused data from GNSS and inertial sensors. An interactive multiple model (IMM) method was combined with the EKF-based integrity monitoring framework, to provide position estimates at a meaningful trustlevel.
Among several methods developed to monitor a system's integrity, the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) method inherently possesses desirable characteristics, particularly for ground-based receivers in urban canyons, due to its design flexibility and adaptability to the urban environment [21, 22] . In contrast to external integrity monitoring methods, RAIM alleviates the need for costly, bulky, and computationally intensive algorithms in the sense that RAIM detects GNSS pseudorange measurement faults by only exploiting the redundancy of GNSS signals to check the measurements' consistency. RAIM can optionally be coupled with the output of other navigation sensors to improve the integrity monitoring performance [23] .
RAIM for the GNSS-based navigation solution is a well-studied topic. However, to the author's knowledge, no research on RAIM for cellular-based navigation has been performed. Research developed over decades for GNSSbased RAIM could serve as a starting point for integrity monitoring of a cellular-based navigation solution. However, GNSS methods do not directly apply to cellular-based navigation integrity monitoring due to fundamental differences between cellular and GNSS signals. First, due to the low elevation angles at which cellular signals are received, cellular signals experience more multipath and signal line-of-sight (LOS) blockage compared to GNSS signals, particularly for ground-based receivers in urban canyons. Second, unlike GNSS-based navigation where the clock error states of GNSS satellites are transmitted in the navigation message, cellular towers do not transmit their clock biases. As such, the clock error states of cellular transmitters must be estimated [24] . This paper proposes a RAIM framework for cellular-based AGV navigation. The framework considers an AGV equipped with a receiver capable of producing pseudorange measurements to nearby cellular towers and an inertial measurement unit (IMU). The tower's locations are assumed to be known (e.g., via signal mapping [24] [25] [26] ). A detection test is formulated to detect and exclude faulty (i.e., biased) pseudorange measurements and horizontal protection level (HPL) is derived. Experimental results are presented for a ground vehicle navigation in an urban environment (downtown Riverside, California). It is demonstrated that the developed RAIM framework successfully detects and excludes faulty pseudorange measurements, reducing the two-dimensional (2D) position root mean-square error (RMSE) by 49%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the AGV's and cellular transmitters' state, the cellular pseudorange measurement model, and the EKF that fuses cellular pseudorange measurements with the AGV's IMU. Section III introduces basic integrity monitoring requirements for AGVs and proposes a RAIM framework to monitor the integrity of the cellular-derived navigation solution. Section IV presents experimental results evaluating the proposed framework in an urban environment with cellular LTE signals. Concluding remarks are provided in Section V.
II. NAVIGATION FRAMEWORK
This section describes the ground vehicle navigation framework. The environment is assumed to comprise N s terrestrial cellular transmitters, denoted {S n } Ns n=1 . It is assumed that the vehicle knows the location of the cellular transmitters (e.g., from a local or a cloud-hosted database). This database could be generated a priori via several approaches, such as radio mapping (e.g., [24, 26] ) or satellite images. It is also assumed that the vehicle has an initial period of access to GNSS signals. During this period, the vehicle estimates its state and the cellular transmitters' clock biases. After this period, it is assumed that GNSS signals become unusable, and the vehicle begins to navigate exclusively with cellular signals. The remainder of this section describes the vehicle-mounted receiver clock error dynamics, vehicle's state, and the EKF-based navigation framework.
A. Receiver Clock Error State
The receiver clock error state is given by
where c is the speed of light, δt r is the receiver's clock bias, andδt r is the receiver's clock drift. The vehiclemounted receiver clock error state is assumed to evolve according to a double integrator driven by process noisẽ w clk,r w δt,r ,wδ t,r T , whose elements are modeled as zero-mean, mutually independent white noise processes and the power spectral density ofw clk,r is given byQ clk,r = diag Sw δt,r , Swδ t,r [27] . The discrete-time equivalent of the clock error dynamics can be expressed as
where T is the sampling period and w clk,r is the discrete-time equivalent process noise with covariance Q clk,r given by
T .
B. AGV State
The AGV is assumed to be equipped with:
• an IMU and • a receiver capable of producing pseudorange measurements to cellular transmitters (e.g., [7, 10, 28, 29] ).
If the vehicle is equipped with other navigation sensors (e.g., lidar, camera, etc.), the proposed framework could seamlessly integrate the outputs of these sensors to improve the vehicle's navigation solution. The vehicle's state vector x v is defined as 
C. EKF Prediction Error Covariance Time Update
This subsection discusses calculation of the prediction error covariance time update. The EKF estimates the state vector x consisting of the vehicle's and the receiver's clock error states simultaneously, i.e., x x
as the state estimate produced by the EKF at time-step k, which is obtained using all measurements (IMU and cellular pseudorange) from time-step 1 to j ≤ k. Note that the quaternion representation is an over-determined representation of the orientation of the vehicle. Hence, the estimation error covariance associated with the quaternion estimate will always be singular. To avoid singularity, the 3-axis angle error vectorθ ∈ R 3 is used to form the orientation error state vector. Denoteq as the estimate ofq and the error quaternion as δq, then, the orientation error model follows the quaternion multiplication model given by,
where ⊗ is the quaternion multiplication operator. The vehicle's and receiver's clock error states are defined using the standard additive error model (i.e.,ṽ v −v). Therefore, the prediction error vector at time-step k in the EKF is expressed asx
with the associated prediction error covariance P(k|j). Details of this prediction error model can be found in [33] [34] [35] [36] .
D. EKF Measurement Model
After discretization and mild approximations, the pseudorange made by the vehicle-mounted receiver on the n-th cellular transmitter at the k-th time-step can be shown to be
where r sn [x sn , y sn , z sn ] T is the location of the n-th cellular transmitter, δt sn is the clock bias of the n-th cellular transmitter, and v sn is the measurement noise, which is modeled as a DT zero-mean white Gaussian sequence with variance σ 2 sn [37] . The clock biases {δt sn } Ns n=1 are modeled as a first-order polynomials [38, 39] , i.e., δt sn (k) = δt sn kT + δt sn,0 , whereδt sn is the constant clock drift of the n-th cellular transmitter and δt sn,0 is the corresponding initial bias. The coefficients δ t sn , δt sn,0 
and it is assumed that the measurement noise {v sn } Ns n=1 are independent.
E. EKF State and Covariance Measurement Update
The state measurement updatex(k+1|k+1) and associated estimation error covariance P(k + 1|k + 1) are computed using standard EKF update equations [31] , except for the orientation state which is updated according to the quaternion error model [35] . The corresponding measurement Jacobian H is given by
where,
The measurement noise covariance takes the form
III. RAIM FOR CELLULAR-BASED NAVIGATION
RAIM is an integrity monitoring technique based on consistency check of redundancy of range measurements. It consists of two main stages:
Stage 1: Performs a fault detection test to detect performance anomalies and to distinguish between fault-free and faulty operations. Stage 2: Provides a horizontal protection level (HPL), which is the statistical error bound that guarantees that the probability of the absolute position error exceeding a pre-defined threshold is smaller than or equal to the target integrity risk [40] .
The target integrity risk refers to the maximum probability with which a receiver is allowed to provide position failures not detected by the integrity monitoring system [41] . This section, outlines the fault detection steps and describes the steps to compute the HPL for cellular-based navigation.
A. Fault Detection Test
A faulty operation occurs when a bias with magnitude b n is injected into the pseudorange measurement drawn from the n-th cellular transmitter. This could be due to a cellular transmitter failure, signal LOS blockage, or high signal attenuation. In this section, a maximum of only one fault at each time-step is considered. In order to distinguish between fault-free and faulty operations, a measurable scalar parameter is defined that provides information about pseudorange measurement errors. This parameter, called a test statistic ϕ, is a random variable with a known distribution.
The test statistic is generated using the normalized innovation squared (NIS) [42] according to
where the innovation vector ν and its corresponding covariance matrix S are computed from
NIS-based test statistics follow a chi-square distribution in a fault-free operation and a non-central chi-square distribution in faulty operations [42] . The degrees of freedom d of the distributions in both fault-free and faulty operations is d = N s − 4, and the non-centrality parameter in a faulty operation is given by
where the vector u n (k + 1) [0, . . . , 0, b n (k + 1), 0, . . . , 0] T indicates the faulty cellular transmitter along with the magnitude of the bias in the pseudorange measurement drawn from the faulty cellular transmitter. The fault detection is achieved by comparing the test statistic against the detection threshold T h , i.e.,
The value of T h is obtained using a given probability of false alarm, P FA , under a fault-free operation according to
where
is the probability density function (pdf) of the chi-square distribution with d degrees of freedom. The value of T h can be obtained from a chi-square cumulative density function (cdf) table using P FA and d.
B. Horizontal Protection Level
For each estimated position, RAIM provides HPL, a circular area centered at the user's real position, which is assured to contain the estimated position with a probability equal or higher than 1 − P MD , where P MD is the probability of missed detection [43] . The decision of alert is done by comparing the HPL and a specified horizontal alert limit (HAL), which is the largest position error allowable for a safe operation, i.e., HPL > HAL : the alarm triggers, HPL ≤ HAL : the alarm does not trigger.
The non-centrality parameter of the chi-square distribution under a faulty operation that results in a missed detection rate P MD is denoted λ min . Given a desired P MD as a design parameter and T h obtained from (5), λ min is computed according to
where f χ 2 d ,λmin represents the pdf of the non-central chi-square distribution with d degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter λ min . The value of λ min can be obtained from a chi-square cdf table.
Next, a parameter called slope n is introduced to project the bias in the faulty measurement onto the horizontal position error domain. A recursive derivation for slope n is calculated using the EKF update equation according to
where ∆x err,n is the additive bias in the error states and
where K is the Kalman gain and
Since the fault in the measurement is being projected onto the horizontal plane, only the fourth and fifth rows of Ξ(k + 1) (i.e., x-and y-directions in the global frame) are used to construct slope n . Subsequently, slope n is expressed as
where (S −1 ) n,n indicates the n-th diagonal element of matrix S −1 and
The HPL is calculated as the projection onto the horizontal position domain of the pseudorange measurement bias that generates a non-centrality parameter equal to λ min in the cellular transmitter with the maximum slope [41] , i.e.,
where slope max (k + 1) = max n {slope n (k + 1)} , n = 1, . . . , N s .
Similar to GNSS-based RAIM [40] , fault exclusion in cellular-based RAIM is performed by constructing N s subsets of N s − 1 pseudorange measurements. Assuming that only one of the cellular transmitters is faulty, applying the fault detection procedure described above to each subset will result in a fault in all subsets except the one from which the faulty cellular transmitter's pseudorange measurement is excluded. Fig. 1 demonstrates a step-by-step summary of the proposed cellular-based RAIM technique. Step-by-step summary of the proposed cellular-based RAIM technique. The proposed method consists of four parts: EKF calculations, availability check, fault detection, and fault exclusion.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A field test was conducted to validate the proposed framework on a ground vehicle navigation in an urban environment (downtown Riverside, California). This section presents the hardware used in this experiment along with the experimental results.
A. Experimental Hardware Setup and Scenario Description
A vehicle was equipped with an integrated AsteRx-i V GPS-IMU sensor [44] whose x-axis points toward the front of the vehicle, z-axis points upward, and y-axis points to the right side of the ground vehicle. The IMU returns six measurements (accelerations and rotational rates along the three orthogonal axes of the body frame) at a rate of 100 Hz. Over the course of the experiment, the ground-truth trajectory of the vehicle was obtained from its integrated GPS-IMU navigation system, while the IMU accelerations and rotational rates outputs were used to propagate the states. Septentrio's post-processing software development kit (PP-SDK) was used to process carrier phase observables collected by the AsteRx-i V and by a nearby differential GPS base station to obtain a carrier phase-based navigation solution. This integrated GNSS-IMU real-time kinematic (RTK) system was used to produce the ground-truth results with which the proposed navigation framework was compared. The ground vehicle was also equipped with two cellular antennas to acquire and track signals from nearby cellular LTE towers. The LTE antennas used for the experiment were consumer-grade 800/1900 MHz cellular antennas. The signals were simultaneously down-mixed and synchronously sampled via a National Instruments (NI) dual-channel universal software radio peripheral (USRP)-2954R, driven by a GPS-disciplined oscillator (GSPDO). The clock bias and drift process noise power spectral densities of the receiver were set to be 1.3 × 10 −22 s and 7.89 × 10 −25 1/s respectively, since the 2954R USRPs are equipped with oven-controlled crystal oscillators (OCXOs). The receiver was tuned to carrier frequencies of 1955 MHz and 739 MHz, which are channels allocated for U.S. cellular provider AT&T. Samples of the received signals were stored for off-line post-processing. The Multichannel Adaptive TRansceiver Information eXtractor (MATRIX) software-defined receiver (SDR) developed in [45] was used to produce LTE pseudoranges. were calculated during an initial period of GNSS availability.
Moreover, during the period of GNSS availability, the vehicle's orientation I Gq , position G r r , velocity Gṙ r , and its clock error states x clk,r were estimated along with their corresponding covariance, which were used to initialize the EKF. The gyroscope's and accelerometer's biases were initialized by taking the mean of 5 seconds of IMU data, when the receiver was stationary. The measurement noise variances were determined empirically. 
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B. Experimental Results
The fault detection test and HPL calculations were performed throughout the experimental test. The results are shown in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 (a) shows the fault detection test, which compares the test statistic ϕ against the detection threshold T h . It can be seen that at t = 25 s, the threshold is exceeded; therefore, the test is not declared successful (see the red circle in Fig. 3 (a) ). This implies that at least one of the measurements was faulty and its contribution to the test statistic was significant enough for the test to fail. The fault exclusion technique indicated that the faulty measurement was the pseudorange drawn from the first cellular LTE tower. The 2D position RMSE of the navigation solution without measurement exclusion was 6.8 m, while the 2D position RMSE with the developed RAIM framework was 3.5 m. Hence, incorporating the developed RAIM framework in this paper reduced the position RMSE by 49%. Fig. 3(b) -(c) show the position estimation error with and without fault exclusion. Fig. 4 illustrates the HPL and HAL. In contrast to weighted least-square (WLS)-based RAIM [43] where the HPL does not depend on the current measurements and can be predicted according to the expected satellite/user geometry, the HPL in the proposed RAIM method depends on both the current states and measurements. Therefore, it must be calculated at each time-step. As can be seen, over the course of the experiment, HPL does not exceed HAL. Subsequently, RAIM was available throughout the experiment, which means that RAIM was able to detect the presence of the faults within the required P MD .
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a framework for AGV integrity monitoring in GNSS-challenged environment was developed. To this end, an EKF-based RAIM technique was proposed, which used an IMU and pseudoranges extracted from ambient cellular LTE towers. The proposed RAIM framework detects and excludes faulty measurements and calculates the HPL. Experimental results over a total traversed trajectory of 1.35 km validated the efficacy of the proposed framework and showed that the proposed RAIM-based measurement exclusion technique reduced the 2D position RMSE by 49%.
